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MARYLAND'S CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION APPROACH
FOR MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL COMPANIES: MOVING
TOWARD UNIFORMITY, YET STILL LACKING
ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Building on the well-known strategy of placing intellectual prop-
erty assets in overseas tax havens to minimize federal tax bills,' corpo-
rations began establishing intangible holding companies' beginning
in the 1980s to reduce state income taxes.3 This method works as fol-
lows. Certain states, including Maryland, follow a separate reporting
scheme with regard to corporate tax returns.4 As such, state law re-
quires separate entities to file separate tax returns.5 Therefore, apply-
ing the traditional physical presence standard for establishing a
nexus,6 a parent corporation owned and operated in Maryland would
generally pay corporate income taxes in Maryland. 7 In contrast, a sub-
1. Glenn R. Simpson, Diminishing Returns: A Tax Maneuver In Delaware Puts Squeeze on
States, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at Al.
2. A holding company is a corporation set up to hold a controlling interest in one or
more entities. LAWRENCE S. RJTTER & WILLIAM L. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING,
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 624 (8th ed. 1993).
3. See generally Simpson, supra note 1, at Al (outlining the tax minimization scheme
employed by corporations using intangible holding companies); Joel McMahan, Follow the
Money: A Look at State Challenges to Passive Income Subsidiaries, ST. TAX TODAY, May 28, 2002,
at 4-5, available at LEXIS, 2002 STT 102-2 (outlining the mechanisms of the holding com-
pany plan); Ashley B. Howard, Comment, Does the Internal Revenue Code Provide a Solution to
a Common State Taxation Problem?: Proposing State Adoption of § 367(d) to Tax Intangibles Hold-
ing Subsidiaries, 53 EMORY L.J. 561, 562-68 (2004) (summarizing the procedures for estab-
lishing and benefits of using intangible holding companies).
4. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-811 (1997); SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Trea-
sury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 WL 322666, at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999).
5. Id.
6. A "nexus" is generally considered a sufficient link or connection. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1066 (7th ed. 1999). In the context of a state's ability to tax the income of a
corporation, the state must generally demonstrate some connection between the corpora-
tion's activities and the state, such as the corporation maintaining a physical presence in
the state, so that taxing the corporation does not run afoul of the Commerce or the Due
Process Clauses. See also infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (outlining the constitu-
tional limitations of taxation under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses).
7. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 81, 825 A.2d 399, 401
(2003) (noting that because it has extensive business contacts in Maryland and owned and




sidiary corporation that did not have employees, bank accounts, prop-
erty, or direct sales of goods or services in Maryland would generally
not pay income tax in Maryland.' In fact, if the subsidiary was an in-
tangible holding company and incorporated in Delaware, where most
are, it would not pay any income tax in Delaware either, as income
from intangibles is generally not taxed.9 Consequently, the parent
corporation would make royalty payments for the use of the intellec-
tual property assets to the intangible holding company; these royalty
payments would not be reported in Maryland or taxed in Delaware
and would be simultaneously deducted from the parent corporation's
total income amount reported to Maryland."°
Recently, in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. and Comptroller of
the Treasury v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (Delaware), Inc.,"t the Court
of Appeals of Maryland explored the bounds within which the State
can assess income tax on subsidiary companies without violating ei-
ther the Commerce Clause' 2 or the Due Process Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution. 4 Specifically, the court considered
whether Maryland had the requisite nexus to tax two intangible hold-
ing companies which conducted no business in Maryland, owned no
tangible property in Maryland, but were subsidiaries of parent corpo-
rations that operated in Maryland. 5 The Court of Appeals reversed
the Maryland Tax Court's decision and instead found that the intangi-
ble holding companies lacked real economic substance and thus were
susceptible to a unitary business evaluation with its parent corpora-
tions located in Maryland. 6 The court accordingly held that the State
8. See id. (noting that because it did not own or lease property in Maryland, employ
any personnel in Maryland, establish any bank accounts in Maryland, or directly sell prod-
ucts or services in Maryland, SYL, Inc. never filed Maryland corporate income tax returns);
see also infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (explaining that under the traditional
physical presence nexus standard, an entity without an actual presence in that state gener-
ally is exempt from paying taxes in that state).
9. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 83, 825 A.2d at 402.
10. Id.
11. 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003). Due to the factual parallels between the two
cases, the Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and delivered a joint opinion.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . .among the several states." Id.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause states that "[n]o state
shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
14. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 80, 825 A.2d at 400.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 101, 106, 825 A.2d at 412, 415. Using the unitary business evaluation, a court
first defines the overall scope of the taxed enterprise and then evaluates the formula to
apportion the total income of the enterprise among the taxing jurisdictions. Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983). Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals determined that the State could demonstrate the requisite nexus between the out-
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had satisfactorily established a constructive nexus 17 with each intangi-
ble holding company.18 As such, the court concluded that Maryland
could validly tax the enterprises' combined income attributable to
their in-state activities. 9
The decision in SYL represents the current trend of courts fash-
ioning piecemeal solutions to the problem of establishing a nexus in
an era where businesses are shifting toward the digital environment.
20
Rather than discretely apply a single constructive or attributional
method for establishing nexus,2 the Court of Appeals used selected
elements of multiple methods of establishing nexus to craft its deci-
sion.22 While the judgment in SYL may ultimately be defensible, 23 the
lack of a clear standard creates the potential for unpredictable judicial
outcomes when applying this expanded taxation approach to other
factual scenarios of out-of-state intangible holding companies.
Consequently, shortly after SYL was decided, the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly enacted two separate bills. Senate Bill 187 established a
statutory settlement period during which corporations could pay tax
liabilities from years past based on the Court of Appeals' decision in
SYL. 24 Concurrently, the legislature passed House Bill 297 in an at-
tempt to prospectively prevent the further use of out-of-state intangi-
ble holding companies. 25  While they represent a step toward
of-state intangible holding company and the in-state parent corporation by showing the
existence of a unitary relationship between the two entities. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 100, 825
A.2d at 411-12.
17. While some states require the corporation's actual physical presence in the taxing
state to establish nexus, some states consider an inferred or implied nexus through devel-
oped practices sufficient to tax the entity. See infra notes 45-86 and accompanying text
(outlining the various standards for establishing nexus that are used by states).
18. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
19. Id. at 108-09, 825 A.2d at 417.
20. The traditional, narrow physical presence requirement for establishing a nexus has
become less applicable in the digital age. Frank Shafroth, "' The Tax Doctor'" The Phantom
of the Corporate Tax Opera, ST. TAX TODAY, July 7, 2003, at 22, available at LEXIS, 2003 STT
129-5.
21. See generally John P. Barrie & Carole L. Iles, Attributional Nexus: Taxing Corporations
That Lack Sufficient In-State Presence, 4J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 18, 19-20 (1994) (outlining the
agency theory and unitary business approach for establishing nexus); Timothy H. Gillis &
Ann L. Holley, States Apply the Federal Sham Transaction Doctrine to Intangible Holding Compa-
nies, 98 J. TAx'N 173, 174, 176 (2003) (outlining the sham transaction doctrine, which
allows courts to disregard the separate existence of a subsidiary company for taxation pur-
poses if it finds that the business purpose and economic substance of the entity were a
sham).
22. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 100, 107, 825 A.2d at 411, 416.
23. See infra notes 89-104 (outlining the progression of cases that has shaped Mary-
land's nexus requirement and from which the attributional approach in SYL emerged).
24. S.B. 187, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004).
25. H.B. 297, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004).
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uniformity, these measures will only produce temporary relief given
the potential legal challenges by corporations, continued requirement
of enforcement proceedings by the State, and the likely standardiza-
tion of allowable purposes for which corporations can create entities
to reduce their tax liability.26 A more effective response would have
been to enact a combined reporting tax scheme, thus shifting Mary-
land away from its currently used separate reporting plan.27
This comment will discuss the potential effects of SYL and the
subsequent tax legislation in Maryland. In particular, it will outline
how a shift from the currently used separate reporting scheme for fil-
ing tax returns to a combined reporting procedure would help pro-
vide uniformity to Maryland's corporate income taxation laws by
establishing a more defined benchmark for determining the allowable
taxation of corporate income. 28 Ultimately, using combined report-
ing would give adequate guidance to the business community, 29 re-
duce the administrative burden on the State,3 ° and allow for sufficient
legislative flexibility, thus still respecting Maryland's sovereignty
rights.3 i
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of the Taxation Approaches Employed by States
A state's ability to tax is derived from its constitutionally protected
right of sovereignty.3 2 Nonetheless, the Commerce and the Due Pro-
26. See infra text accompanying notes 249-278 (discussing the potential problems with
S.B. 187 and H.B. 297).
27. See also Tim Fallaw, The Practice of Corporate Entity Isolation: Past, Present, and Future,
ST. TAX TODAY, Aug. 7, 2000, at 46, available at LEXIS, 2000 STT 152-27 (noting the bene-
fits of combined versus separate reporting).
28. See infra notes 279-314 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992) (stating that cer-
tainty in the sales and use tax laws "encourages settled expectations and ... fosters invest-
ment by businesses and individuals").
30. See CHARLES A. TROST & PAULJ. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LO-
CAL TAXATION 2d § 10.7 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that uncertainty in states' taxation scope
causes complexity in both compliance and enforcement).
31. See Shafroth, supra note 20, at 22 (commenting on the need to respect states' fun-
damental sovereignty rights when determining their nexus standards); ADVISORY COMM'N
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, at
5-6 (April 1983) (observing the states' desire to determine their own fiscal structures); see
also Fallaw, supra note 27, at 46 (noting that requiring combined reporting would immedi-
ately and conclusively plug the tax loophole achieved by using an entity isolation method);
Simpson, supra note 1, at Al (noting that California and over twenty-four other states have
enacted a combined reporting strategy and thus are largely immune to entity isolation
method strategy); see infra notes 293-305 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits to
Maryland under combined reporting).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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cess Clauses of the United States Constitution place limitations on the
scope of a state's taxing authority.33 For instance, in Quill Corporation
v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court established the phys-
ical presence rule to ensure that sales and use taxes imposed by a state
do not overly burden interstate commerce or deprive a person of pri-
vate property without due process.34 Although the physical presence
test has thus far remained largely intact, it has not been extended to
restrict all types of taxes-only sales and use taxes. 35 As a result, diver-
gent nexus standards have emerged among states for taxing the in-
comes of multi-jurisdictional corporations.3 6 While some states have
adhered to the physical presence standard for assessing the constitu-
tionality of state income taxes, other states have relaxed the actual
presence requirement by allowing various approaches to create a con-
structive nexus.
37
1. Constitutional Limitations.-While the Constitution permits
states to levy taxes, it also places restrictions upon the states' ability to
execute that right. For instance, the Commerce Clause provides Con-
gress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
states."3 This clause has been subsequently interpreted to allow states
to levy taxes as long as interstate commerce is not unduly burdened. 9
Additionally, the Due Process Clause provides that "[n] o state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."40 This clause thus requires a nexus between the taxpayer and
the taxing state as well as a rational relationship between the income
taxed and the taxed entity before a tax is constitutional.4
To prove the nexus element, the Supreme Court has determined
that a state can demonstrate that the entity to be taxed availed itself of
the benefits of operating within the state.42 Although the level of
proof necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause is not as high as that
33. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
34. 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
35. Id. at 314.
36. See infra notes 45-86 and accompanying text (outlining the physical presence, eco-
nomic, and attributional methods used for establishing nexus and thus the ability to tax).
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
42. Id. at 437.
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required under the Commerce Clause,4" the methods for analyzing
each nexus requirement are comparable."
2. Spectrum of Methods to Satisfy Nexus.-Courts have allowed a
number of methods for satisfying the nexus requirement. Several are
noted below.
a. Physical Presence.-In Quill Corporation v. North Dakota,45
the Supreme Court considered whether North Dakota's imposition of
a use tax on sales of an out-of-state mail-order company violated either
the Due Process or the Commerce Clause where it maintained no re-
tail store or sales representatives within the state.4 6 Under the due
process analysis, the Court found that the minimum contacts require-
ment was satisfied because the company purposefully directed activi-
ties toward North Dakota by soliciting business from its residents for
its mail-order business.47 However, under the Commerce Clause anal-
ysis, relying on National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the
State of Illinois," the Court applied the physical presence rule.49 As
such, the Court ultimately concluded that because the out-of-state
mail-order business had no retail offices or sales representatives, it had
no substantial nexus, and thus the use tax imposed by the state was
unconstitutional. 50 While Quill directly reaffirmed the use of a physi-
cal presence test from Bellas Hess with regard to sales and use taxes,
the Supreme Court nonetheless left the nexus standard for state in-
come taxation unresolved.5'
43. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 (stating that "the substantial nexus requirement is not,
like due process' minimum contacts requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means
for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce") (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Division, 313 Md.
118, 126, 131-32, 544 A.2d 764, 768, 770 (1988) (noting that "[u]nder both the Due Pro-
cess and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a state may not, when imposing an in-
come-based tax, tax value earned outside its borders" or "tax a corporation's interstate
activities unless there exists a minimal connection or nexus between the interstate activities
and the taxing [s]tate, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the
[s]tate and the intrastate values of the enterprise") (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
46. Id. at 301.
47. Id. at 308.
48. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
49. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
50. Id. at 301, 319.
51. See id. at 314 ("Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articu-
lated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use
taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule.").
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b. Economic Nexus.-Only one year after Quill was decided,
Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission5 2 challenged the tradi-
tional physical presence requirement with regard to corporate income
taxation." In Geoffrey, the Supreme Court of South Carolina consid-
ered whether the State's taxation on royalty income of an intangible
holding company incorporated in Delaware was prohibited by either
the Due Process or the Commerce Clause, and ultimately upheld the
State's income tax of Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toys
"R" Us, Inc.
54
Under the Due Process Clause, the court determined that the
nexus requirement was satisfied without the corporation's actual pres-
ence in the state because the corporation purposefully directed activ-
ity at South Carolina's economic forum and because the disputed
income was rationally related to the State." In particular, the court
highlighted the degree of control Geoffrey Inc. possessed over its in-
tangible assets and the contemplated and purposeful action it took to
obtain economic benefit from the State.56 Additionally, the court de-
termined that the nexus requirement under the Due Process Clause
could also be satisfied by the actual presence of Geoffrey, Inc.'s intan-
gible property in the State.57 The court thus rejected the subsidiary's
claim that because the entity itself was located in Delaware, the intel-
lectual property assets were located exclusively in that state.5"
Under the Commerce Clause analysis, the court determined that
the State had established a sufficient nexus to Geoffrey, Inc.59 To sat-
isfy the substantial nexus requirement, the court determined that the
presence of the intellectual assets within the State was enough.6"
52. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 16, 19.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. The court also noted several advantages Geoffrey, Inc. obtained from South
Carolina, including protection (i.e., enforcement of intellectual property rights), benefits
(i.e., orderly, society to earn income), and opportunities to earn income (i.e., market po-
tential with customer base). Id. at 17-18. Without these services provided by the state,
Geoffrey, Inc. would not be able to earn income under its royalty agreement with Toys "R"
Us, its parent company. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 16-17. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Geoffrey's argument that
its intangible assets were located exclusively within Delaware, as its sales with Toys "R" Us
created an account receivable with the franchise that was located within South Carolina.
Id. at 16. As such, the court determined that the taxation of intangible property did not
necessitate a showing of real estate or tangible property within the state. Id. at 17.
58. Id. at 16-17.
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id. Citing JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION § 6.08
(3d ed. 2001), the court noted that "any corporation that regularly exploits the markets of
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Thus, by licensing the intellectual property assets to Toys "R" Us,
which operated within the state, and by deriving income from that
arrangement, the court found that Geoffrey, Inc. had substantial
nexus with South Carolina for it to be subject to the state income
tax.
6 1
c. Attributional Nexus.-Although Geoffrey's economic benefit
or purposeful availment argument considerably pushed the limits of
the traditional physical presence nexus requirement, a middle ground
has developed. Using attributional nexus, a state can create a link
with an out-of-state corporation by using the actual presence of an in-
state actor that is in some way associated with the out-of-state entity.
62
Three methods have emerged.
The first method of establishing an attributional nexus is through
an agency theory approach. Generally, the parent corporation's own-
ership level of its subsidiaries alone does not generate liability for the
parent for the actions of its subsidiaries.6" But, when the parent cor-
poration exercises a considerable amount of control over the subsidi-
ary with regard to daily operations, liability may be triggered through
an agency relationship.64
For example, in Western Acceptance Company v. State of Florida, De-
partment of Revenue,65 the District Court of Appeals of Florida consid-
ered whether the state could impose a corporate tax on a subsidiary
that owned no offices and had no employees inside or outside Florida,
but conducted business through its parent corporation located in
Florida.66 The court determined that the subsidiary satisfied the req-
uisite nexus with the state because it was "doing business" within Flor-
ida, based on the definition provided in the state statute.67 The
a state should be subject to itsjurisdiction to impose an income tax even though not physi-
cally present." Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Western Acceptance Co. v. State of Florida, Dep't of Revenue, 472 So. 2d
497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (using an agency nexus approach); Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002) (using the sham transaction doctrine);
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (using the unitary busi-
ness approach).
63. Astrocom Electronics, Inc. v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 404 N.Y.S.2d 742,
744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
64. Id. ("The determinative factor is whether the subsidiary corporation is a dummy for
the parent corporation.").
65. 472 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
66. Id. at 499.
67. Id. at 504. The Florida Income Tax Code allows for the taxation of "domestic...
[and] foreign corporations qualified to do business in this state or actually doing business in
this state." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.03(1)(e) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
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factors the court considered included the subsidiary's exclusive reli-
ance on the parent corporation to conduct business, its contractual
agreement with the parent company allowing the parent company to
act as the subsidiary's agent to collect payments, and its authorization
to the parent corporation to utilize the Florida judicial system to carry
out the collection process.68 As such, the state could validly tax the
subsidiary because it was "doing business" in Florida through its par-
ent corporation, which acted as the subsidiary's agent.69
The second method of establishing an attributional nexus is
through the sham transaction doctrine. In Sherwin-Williams Company
v. Commissioner of Revenue,7 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
considered whether the State properly disallowed the parent com-
pany's deduction for royalty payments made to its two subsidiaries.7
Applying the sham transaction doctrine, which allows a state to disre-
gard an actual transaction for taxation purposes because it lacks the
requisite substance or purpose, the court determined that although
the business purpose of the transactions was tax motivated, the trans-
actions did have economic substance.72 Conducting a predominantly
factual inquiry, the court concluded that the subsidiary companies
were not simply businesses in form, but did in fact carry out substan-
tive business activity.73 Consequently, the court determined that the
parent company could validly deduct the royalty payments made to
the subsidiary entities." As such, the attributional nexus under the
sham transaction doctrine was not satisfied because the court decided
that the transactions between the subsidiary companies and the par-
ent corporation were genuine."
The last method of establishing an attributional nexus is through
a unitary business approach. In Container Corporation of America v.
Franchise Tax Board,76 the Supreme Court considered whether a
franchise tax imposed by California on a Delaware corporation, head-
68. Western, 472 So. 2d at 504.
69. Id.
70. 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002).
71. Id. at 507-08.
72. Id. at 512, 519.
73. Id. at 515, 517. The factors the court considered included: the transference of legal
and physical possession of the intellectual assets to the subsidiaries, the establishment of
obligations by the subsidiaries to unrelated third parties, the collection of royalty payments
from unrelated third parties that were used to earn additional income for the subsidiaries,
and incurrence of substantial liabilities by the subsidiaries to unrelated third parties to
maintain, manage, and protect the intellectual assets. Id. at 517.
74. Id. at 520.
75. Id. at 519.
76. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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quartered in Illinois but doing business in California, violated either
the Due Process or the Commerce Clause.7 v The Court upheld the
state tax and the application of a unitary business method for appor-
tioning the tax, holding that the entities were engaged in a function-
ally integrated enterprise.78 In particular, the Court focused on the
controlling management relationship between the parent and the
subsidiary companies, the economies of scale created by integrating
the entities, and the flow of value transferred between the entities.
79
Consequently, the Court determined that given these factors, an ap-
portionment formula could be applied.8 °
Notwithstanding the decision in Container Corporation, the unitary
business approach for establishing attributional nexus has not been
widely accepted. For example, in SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon,
8 1
the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered whether sales and use
taxes on a mail-order company violated the Due Process or the Com-
merce Clause.82 The court concluded that because the state's only
contacts with the mail-order company were through mail carriers, the
taxation was unconstitutional under the Bellas Hess physical presence
standard. 3 In so doing, the court rejected the state's argument that a
group of corporations that are formed and operated as a unitary busi-
ness can be taxed collectively.84 Nonetheless, the court did note that
the separate treatment between the parent company and its subsidiary
would not be recognized where the corporate assets had been com-
bined, the corporate formalities were not recognized, and the subsidi-
ary entity lacked the necessary funding to cover normal business
expenses.85 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that none of
77. Id. at 162.
78. Id. at 184.
79. Id. at 177-79. The Court also noted several other factors that contributed to its
decision, including the parent company's furnishing of capital, equipment, technical sup-
port, general guidance, and employee resources to the subsidiary companies. Id. at 179.
80. Id. at 166. The Supreme Court made several important observations in Container
Corporation. First, because the Constitution imposes no single formula on states, the Su-
preme Court noted that the taxpayer has the obligation of demonstrating that the income
being taxed is income earned outside of the territory. Id. at 164. Second, the Court noted
that the unitary business approach for apportioning value is different than the issue of
taxing multi-jurisdictional entities. Id. at 165. Specifically, the Court observed that the
unitary business method rejects the individualized accounting of income by each entity
and instead opts to treat the enterprises as one, thus apportioning the total income among
the various jurisdictions. Id. Finally, the Court noted that there is more than one way to
satisfy the unitary theory, but it did not define the permissible methods. Id. at 167.
81. 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991).
82. Id. at 668.
83. Id. at 676.
84. Id. at 672-73.
85. Id. at 673.
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those factors were present and thus the sales and use taxes were
unconstitutional.8 6
B. Establishing Attributional Nexus in Maryland
In the 1980s, Maryland began to consider the limits of permissi-
ble income taxation on multi-jurisdictional corporations. But, it was
not until the early 1990s before Maryland slowly began to adopt an
attributional approach, which links an out-of-state entity to an in-state
company, to satisfy the nexus requirement.8 7 However, the evaluation
method to establish attributional nexus remained underdeveloped, as
no single theory prevailed.
8
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Atlantic Supply Company, 9 the Court
of Appeals considered whether the State could tax the entire income
of a subsidiary company incorporated in the District of Columbia but
conduct business within Maryland through its affiliated parent com-
pany.9 ° The court determined that although the subsidiary and par-
ent were involved in a unitary business, the State could not directly tax
the subsidiary's entire income. 1 In assessing whether to apply a uni-
tary business approach, the court determined that it must consider
factors such as the subsidiary's purpose for formation, its operational
business practices, its administrative arrangements, its legal form, its
functional transactions, and its core competencies to determine
whether the parent and the subsidiary were operating a unitary
business.9 2
In NCR Corporation v. Comptroller of the Treasury,93 the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether the State could tax an apportionable
amount of the out-of-state subsidiaries' income where the parent com-
pany had its core operations in Ohio but had several sales and admin-
istrative offices in Maryland. 4 The tax court's determination that the
parent corporation engaged in a unitary business for apportionment
purposes was uncontroverted. 95 Yet, on appeal, the parent corpora-
86. Id.
87. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md. 118, 132, 544 A.2d 764, 771
(1988).
88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (noting the various analyses that
Maryland courts have used with regard to satisfying the nexus requirement).
89. 294 Md. 213, 448 A.2d 955 (1982).
90. Id. at 214, 448 A.2d at 956.
91. Id. at 224, 448 A.2d at 961.
92. Id. at 223-24, 448 A.2d at 961.
93. 313 Md. 118, 544 A.2d 764 (1988).
94. Id. at 122, 544 A.2d at 765.
95. Id., 544 A.2d at 765-66.
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tion argued that some of the income it obtained from its subsidiaries
should not be considered part of the unitary business.96 The Court of
Appeals disagreed, concluding that the primary focus must be on the
relationship of the taxable income to the unitary business, not the
identity of the source of the income to the enterprise.97 Therefore,
because the income was used in furtherance of the unitary business as
a whole, the court concluded that the income could be considered for
apportionment purposes.98
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corporation,99 the
Court of Special Appeals considered whether three Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporations (DISC) °10 were required to pay Maryland
corporate income tax. a'1 The court determined that, although the
subsidiaries were phantom entities created for tax deferring purposes
and were allowable under federal statute, the corporations were none-
theless required to reflect the economic reality of the transactions. 10 2
As such, the very nature of the DISC only allowed it to conduct busi-
ness through branches of its affiliate parent.10 3 Therefore, the court
noted that the entity would either be taxed in accordance with its par-
ent company or not at all, and thus determined that, through the uni-
tary relationship with their parent companies, the three subsidiaries
could be taxed based on their activity in Maryland.104
As shown, Maryland courts had concluded that to determine the
applicable nexus requirement, an assessment of the composition of
the entity in question must be conducted. Although courts used many
evaluation methods, no single determinative standard emerged. Un-
fortunately, SYL failed to provide the much needed clarity in this area.
C. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. and Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (Delaware), Inc.
1. Factual and Procedural Posture of SYL.-
a. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc.-Syms, Inc.
(Syms-Parent) is a NewJersey corporation that sells retail clothing in a
96. Id. at 131, 544 A.2d at 770.
97. Id. at 134, 544 A.2d at 772.
98. Id. at 140, 544 A.2d at 775.
99. 82 Md. App. 429, 572 A.2d 562 (1990).
100. A Domestic International Sales Corporation is a "phantom book entry corporation
created under the federal tax laws as a device to encourage exports through an exemption
from otherwise taxable profits." Id. at 430, 572 A.2d at 563.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 432, 572 A.2d at 563-64.
103. Id. at 435, 572 A.2d at 566.
104. Id. at 437, 572 A.2d at 566.
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number of states, including Maryland.1"5 In 1986, Syms-Parent incor-
porated SYL, Inc. (SYL) in Delaware as a wholly owned subsidiary, and
transferred its intellectual property assets, which included trademarks,
trade names, and advertising slogans, to SYL to manage and con-
trol. 1°6 Syms-Parent and SYL then executed a licensing agreement to
allow Syms-Parent to use the intellectual property assets held by SYL
when Syms-Parent manufactured, used, and sold its clothing prod-
UCts. 1 0 7 In return, Syms-Parent made royalty payments to SYL that av-
eraged $12 million per year.' 08
In 1996, the Comptroller of Maryland, following an audit, as-
sessed SYL corporate income taxes, interest, and penalties of $637,362
for the years of 1986 to 1993.109 The tax assessment against SYL was
sustained following a hearing by a Comptroller's hearing officer.' 0
Relying on Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corporation,
the Comptroller determined that SYL was required to file tax returns
with Maryland based on its income attributable to in-state activity, be-
cause it lacked substantial economic substance and depended on
Syms-Parent for its earnings."' As such, the Comptroller found that
SYL should be taxed based on the "economic reality and the true
source of its income."' 12
SYL appealed the Comptroller's assessment to the Maryland Tax
Court, which reversed the Comptroller's assessment concluding in-
stead that the State failed to establish a sufficient nexus with SYL
under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, found the income tax
assessment unconstitutional." 3 Although the court agreed that SYL
and Syms-Parent were engaged in a unitary business, it determined
105. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 81, 825 A.2d 399, 400 (2003).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 83, 825 A.2d at 402.
109. Id. at 81, 825 A.2d at 401.
110. Id. at 82, 825 A.2d at 401.
111. Id. The determinant factors the Comptroller cited were: (1) SYL's meager business
expenses (i.e., wages); (2) a lack of ordinary business requirements (i.e., dedicated office
space or employees, phone listing, phone service, office signage, business cards, job de-
scriptions, job evaluations); (3) an absence of actual or attempted business transactions
with third parties to license its intellectual property assets; (4) an inability to produce com-
mon business reports (i.e., invoices, travel reports); and (5) an unwillingness to produce a
company official to speak at the hearing. Id at 83-84, 825 A.2d at 402. The record also
indicated that SYL paid out $1200 in annual wages, expensed $1200 in administrative costs
to a third party to maintain a shared office space, and used Syms executives to fill three of
the four board of director positions at SYL. Id. at 84, 87, 825 A.2d at 402, 404.
112. Id. at 82, 825 A.2d at 401.
113. SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 WAL 322666, at *6
(Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999).
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that the State could not base SYL's nexus on that of its parent."'
Therefore, the tax court concluded that Maryland could not constitu-
tionally tax SYL.
On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the tax
court's decision, and the Comptroller appealed to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals. 1 5 The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari before
oral argument in the Court of Special Appeals and consolidated SYL
and Crown Cork to determine whether Maryland's corporate income
tax assessment on an intangible holding company, where its only con-
nection to the State was through its affiliation with its parent company
operating in Maryland, violated either the Commerce Clause or prin-
ciples of due process.' 16
b. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Crown Cork & Seal Com-
pany (Delaware), Inc.-Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (Crown-
Parent), a Delaware corporation that manufactures and sells metal
products, incorporated Crown Cork & Seal (Delaware), Inc. (Crown-
Delaware), as a wholly owned subsidiary in Delaware." 7 Subse-
quently, Crown-Parent transferred its intellectual property assets,
which included thirteen domestic patents and sixteen trademarks, to
Crown-Delaware to manage and control.' 18 Crown-Parent and Crown-
Delaware then executed a licensing agreement to allow Crown-Parent
to use the intellectual property assets held by Crown-Delaware, and, in
return, Crown-Parent made royalty payments to Crown-Delaware that
averaged approximately $30 million per year.119
In 1996, the Comptroller assessed Crown-Delaware corporate in-
come taxes, interest, and penalties of $1,421,034 for the years of 1989
to 1993.12' The assessment was sustained following a hearing by a
Comptroller's hearing officer. 12 ' The Comptroller determined that
114. Id. at *2. Specifically, the tax court found that to enable Maryland to use a con-
structive nexus approach, the taxpaying entity must have no economic substance. Id. The
tax court distinguished SYL from Armco by determining that SYL was an entity of substance
and therefore the traditional physical presence of nexus applied, not the constructive
nexus rule from Armco. Id. at *5. As such, the tax court found that SYL's nexus require-
ment for taxation purposes could not be satisfied through its parent because it was an
entity of substance and did not have actual presence within Maryland and thus the income
tax was unconstitutional. Id at *6.
115. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 91, 825 A.2d at 407.
116. Id. at 80, 825 A.2d at 400.
117. Id. at 92, 825 A.2d at 407.
118. Id.
119. Brief for Appellant at 4, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Crown Cork & Seal Com-
pany (Delaware), Inc., 375 Md. 78, 825 A.2d 399 (2003) (No. 00256).
120. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 92, 825 A.2d at 407.
121. Id.
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based on the apportionment factor of Crown-Parent, Maryland could
levy an income tax on Crown-Delaware.' 22 The Comptroller deter-
mined that the State could pierce the corporate veil of Crown-Dela-
ware because it had little economic substance and no independent
source of income other than its parent company.121 As such, rather
than allow Crown-Parent to use a "phantom company" to avoid paying
taxes, the Comptroller determined that Maryland could validly tax
Crown-Delaware.'
2 4
Crown-Delaware appealed the Comptroller's assessment to the
Maryland Tax Court, which reversed the Comptroller's assessment
and held that the State failed to establish a sufficient nexus with
Crown-Delaware under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, con-
cluded that the income tax assessment was unconstitutional. 125 Incor-
porating the SYL decision by reference, the tax court in Crown Cork
reiterated many of the same issues it had previously determined in
SYL.1 26 Furthermore, the tax court found that Crown-Delaware was
not a phantom or sham corporation because it had legitimate busi-
ness purposes for incorporating. 127 Accordingly, the Maryland Tax
Court held that Crown-Delaware was an entity of economic substance
and thus should not be subjected to Maryland income tax.'12
On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the Tax
Court's decision.' 29 However, as previously noted, the Court of Ap-
peals then issued a writ of certiorari and consolidated SYL and Crown
Cork. 13 0
122. Id at 93, 825 A.2d at 408; see also id. at 100, 825 A.2d at 412 (noting that the Mary-
land Tax Code requires that the net income be apportioned to the state using a three-part
formula of property, payroll, and sales).
123. Id. at 93, 825 A.2d at 407-08. The record also indicated that the total annual wages
paid to all nine employees of Crown-Delaware over the years were $148, $668, $562.64,
$623.79, and $843.66, respectively. Id. at 96, 825 A.2d at 409.
124. Id. at 93, 825 A.2d at 408.
125. Crown Cork & Seal (Delaware) Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-97-0028-
01, 1999 AL 322699, at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999).
126. Id. at *1. Most notably, the court concluded that Maryland lacked sufficient nexus
because Crown-Delaware did not have employees, agents, property, or offices in Maryland.
Id. In addition, the tax court noted that Crown-Delaware produced no income within the
state. Id.
127. Id. In particular, the court highlighted that Crown-Delaware: was protecting valua-
ble intellectual property assets, met all corporate formalities, maintained an office in Dela-
ware, established employment contracts with employees, and obtained an independent
bank account. Id.
128. Id. at *2.




2. The Court of Appeals' Reasoning in SYL.-In Comptroller of the
Treasury v. SYL, Inc., the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Maryland Tax Court, holding instead that the State's corporate in-
come tax assessment on two intangible holding corporations that con-
ducted no business in Maryland, owned no tangible property in
Maryland, but were subsidiaries of parent corporations that operated
in Maryland, did not violate either the Commerce Clause or principles
of due process of the United States Constitution. 31 Noting that the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses are violated when a state imposes
an income-based tax on income earned outside its borders, the court
held that because Maryland could use a constructive nexus approach
to show the income was earned within its borders, it could validly tax
each subsidiary's income attributable to Maryland. 132
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Eldridge first outlined the
statutory requirements for a nexus.13 3 Under the Maryland Tax Code,
the court stated that the legislature intended to tax a multi-state cor-
poration's income to the limits provided by the United States Consti-
tution."3 Thus, the court concluded that the issue in SYL and Crown
Cork was a constitutional question rather than a question of Maryland
statutory interpretation.1 3 5 As such, the court addressed the limits
placed on Maryland's tax assessment under the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses.'1 6 The court concluded that states are permitted to
levy income tax only on value earned inside their borders, and thus
reasoned that Maryland needed to demonstrate a nexus linking each
subsidiary's income to in-state activities to be able to tax the
subsidiary. '
37
One permissible nexus method the court noted was for the State
to show the "existence of [a] unitary business [between the parent
corporation and the intangible holding company], part of which is
carried on in the taxing state.' 38 Once a unitary business relation-
ship is proven, the court observed that the burden then shifts to the
taxpayer to demonstrate "by clear and cogent evidence" that the in-
131. 375 Md. at 80, 109, 825 A.2d at 400, 417.
132. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
133. Id. at 101, 825 A.2d at 412.
134. Id. at 102, 825 A.2d at 413.
135. Id. at 101, 825 A.2d at 412.
136. Id. at 99, 825 A.2d at 411. These were the two constitutional provisions that the
defendants asserted were violated by the Comptroller's corporate income tax assessment.
Id. at 80, 825 A.2d at 400.
137. Id. at 99-100, 825 A.2d at 411-12.
138. Id. at 100, 825 A.2d at 411-12 (citation omitted).
1086 [VOL. 63:1071
2004] INCOME TAX FOR MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL COMPANIES
come earned was extraterritorial. 3 ' If the taxpayer cannot meet this
burden, the court observed, the income tax is presumed valid under
the Commerce and the Due Process Clauses.
140
Next, the court examined two relevant Maryland cases. First, the
court reviewed Comptroller of the Treasury v. Atlantic Supply Company,
which was relied on by the Comptroller and distinguished by the tax
court in both SYL and Crown Cork.'1 ' The court noted that although
the subsidiary in Atlantic had a seemingly legitimate business purpose
for forming a separate entity (i.e., a third party manufacturer refused
to sell directly to the parent retail company), the court held that the
parent and subsidiary carried on a unitary business.' 42 The factors the
court cited as dispositive included: (1) the subsidiary was unable to
function without the capital and customers supplied by the parent
corporation, (2) the subsidiary exclusively sold to the parent com-
pany, and (3) the subsidiary enjoyed administrative benefits (i.e., cler-
ical, accounting, buying and selling agents) from its parent
company. 43 The court commented that in Atlantic the subsidiary was
sufficiently related to the parent corporation to create a unitary busi-
ness relationship, thus permitting Maryland to tax the income attribu-
table to its in-state activities.144 However, the court noted that in
Atlantic no argument was made to exempt all of the subsidiary's in-
come from Maryland tax, as was done in SYL.
14 5
The court then evaluated the Court of Specials Appeals' decision
in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corporation, noting its
greater relevance to the SYL inquiry.146 In contrast to Atlantic, the
court observed that the subsidiary in Armco was created largely for fed-
eral tax benefits by becoming an intermediary between the parent
company and overseas customers. 47 The court noted that in Armco
the Court of Special Appeals reversed the tax and circuit courts by
holding that Maryland did have a sufficient nexus to allow taxation
under the Commerce Clause.1 4 ' The court then highlighted several
determinative factors noted by the Court of Special Appeals. They
139. Id. at 101, 825 A.2d at 412. In other words, the court concluded that the taxpayer
must show that the state is attempting to tax income from an independent and distinct
business operation. Id.
140. Id. at 99, 825 A.2d at 411.
141. Id. at 102, 825 A.2d at 413.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 102-03, 825 A.2d at 413.
144. Id. at 103, 825 A.2d at 413.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id., 825 A.2d at 414.
148. Id. at 104, 825 A.2d at 414.
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included: (1) the subsidiary's lack of activity performed to earn any
income, (2) the subsidiary's position as a device for avoiding tax on
the full amount of income received, (3) the subsidiary's lack of tangi-
ble property and employees, and (4) the subsidiary's reliance entirely
on branches of the parent company.'49 As such, the court observed
that the Court of Special Appeals held that the subsidiary's income
attributable to Maryland was taxable. 150
Judge Eldridge then briefly assessed the composition of SYL and
Crown-Delaware by comparing the facts in each case to those in
Armco.151 Ultimately, the court determined that like the subsidiary in
Armco, both SYL and Crown-Delaware lacked real economic substance,
except that each "had a touch of window dressing designed to create
an illusion of substance. ' 152 Thus, the court determined that neither
subsidiary was a discrete enterprise from its parent corporation. 153
The court noted the following factors about both SYL and Crown-Del-
aware: (1) neither had a full-time employee; (2) part-time employees
were employees of "nexus-service" companies; 154 (3) annual wages
paid were minuscule; (4) office locations were essentially mail drops;
(5) neither performed any substantial activity and what little was done
was performed by officers, directors, and employees of the parent cor-
poration; (6) protection and management of the intellectual property
assets were left unchanged (i.e., counsel obtained by the parent com-
pany was retained); and finally (7) although tax avoidance was not
stated as a primary reason for formation, it in fact was the predomi-
nant reason for creating SYL and Crown-Delaware.' 55 In light of these
facts, the court found that SYL and Crown-Delaware had no more sub-
stance than the subsidiary in Armco.156 Therefore, the court held that
the nexus the State demonstrated using a unitary business approach
149. Id. at 103-04, 825 A.2d at 414.
150. Id. at 105, 825 A.2d at 414.
151. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id.
154. Both SYL and Crown-Delaware utilized a third party to "facilitate the establishment
of its business operations" in the State of Delaware. Id at 94, 825 A.2d at 408. The goal in
employing this third party service was to do "everything necessary ... to comply with the
law and regulations to give substance to [the] company as a viable and good company in
Delaware." Id at 95, 825 A.2d at 409.
155. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415. Also, the court determined a number of the royalty
payments made to Crown-Delaware were transferred back to Crown-Parent on the same day.
Id. at 96, 825 A.2d at 410.
156. Id at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
1088 [VOL. 63:1071
2004] INCOME TAX FOR MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL COMPANIES
was sufficient, and Maryland could validly tax SYL's and Crown-Dela-
ware's income attributable to its in-state activities.
1 5 7
D. The Maryland General Assembly Enters the Fray
In April of 2003, before SYL was decided, the Maryland General
Assembly passed House Bill (H.B.) 753.158 One of the provisions of
this general corporate tax bill inhibited companies from utilizing
holding companies for tax avoidance purposes; however, Governor
Robert Ehrlich, Jr., vetoed the bill. 1 59 Specifically, H.B. 753 required
that corporations taking deductions for intangible expenses would
need to demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence" that the sub-
sidiary did not have a principle purpose of avoiding taxes and the pay-
ments were made at arms length. 16 ° If the corporation was unable to
show this, the interest and intangible expenses paid to related entities
would be added back to the federal taxable income amount to deter-
mine its taxes owed to Maryland.' 6 1 Despite the veto, the Maryland
Legislature persisted with its efforts.
In 2004, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill (S.B.) 187.162
This bill established a statutory settlement period during which corpo-
rations could pay tax liabilities from years past based on the Court of
Appeals' decision in SYL. 1 6  From July 1, 2004 to November 1, 2004,
corporations were given the opportunity to settle with the State in-
come tax that "has been or may be assessed by the Comptroller" as a
157. Id.
158. H.B. 753, 417th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003).
159. Letter from Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., Governor, State of Maryland, to Michael E.
Busch, Speaker of the House of Delegates, Maryland General Assembly (May 21, 2003),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2003rs/veto-letters/hb0
7 53 .htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2004) (stating that changes to corporate income taxation "will place Maryland at a compet-
itive disadvantage with other mid-Atlantic states"); Shafroth, supra note 20, at 13; see also
SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 102 n.4, 825 A.2d at 413 n.4 (noting that the Governor's veto message
stated "[c]urrently, the Comptroller is involved in litigation regarding this very issue. At
this juncture, I believe it is prudent to wait until the Judiciary rules on the matter"). But see
4 MARYLAND BUDGET & TAX POLICY INSTITUTE, Two-Thirds of Maryland's Largest Corporations
Pay NO Corporate Income Tax, No. 8, at 4 (2004) [hereinafter NO Corporate Income Tax] (not-
ing several studies which state that Maryland currently has one of the lowest overall busi-
ness tax environments); 3 MARYLAND BUDGET & TAX POLICY INSTITUTE, Raising Revenues
without Raising Rates: Closing Three Tax Avoidance Loopholes, No. 3, at 7 (2002) [hereinafter
Raising Revenue] (noting several factors-quality of public and private services, the availabil-
ity of qualified workers, and the proximity to suppliers and markets-are more important
than taxes that corporations consider when determining where to locate).
160. H.B. 753.
161. Id.




result of SYL.1 64 If a corporation elected to settle during this period,
the additional taxable amount due was calculated either by: adding
back the deductions taken to the paying (i.e., the entity that made the
interest or intangible expense payments) taxpayer's taxable income,
or subjecting the receiving (i.e., the entity that recognized the interest
or intangible expense payments) taxpayer to Maryland corporate in-
come tax. 1 65 To entice corporations into accepting the offer, S.B. 187
waived all penalties for taxes settled during the established period and
limited the interest accrued to a maximum of 6.5%.166 Moreover, if
the corporation complied with the terms set forth in the bill, the State
would not enforce assessments for any year prior to January 1, 1995.167
In conjunction with S.B. 187, the legislature also passed H.B.
297.168 This bill was enacted to prospectively modify the corporate
income taxation laws. 169 In contrast to the general corporate tax bill
the Governor vetoed in 2003, this bill exclusively attempts to prevent
the further use of out-of-state intangible holding companies.1 ° H.B.
297 includes several elements. First, the bill authorizes the Comptrol-
ler to disperse accountings between and among two or more entities
if: the entities are "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests," and the Comptroller determines the recalculation "is
necessary in order to reflect an arm's length standard" and "to reflect
clearly the income" of the entities. 1 7 ' In addition, to determine the





168. H.B. 297, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004); S.B. 187 (stating that "this Act
shall take effect July 1, 2004, contingent on the taking effect of ... H.B. 297").
169. H.B. 297.
170. Id.
171. Id. H.B. 297 states, in part:
The Comptroller may distribute, apportion, or allocated gross income, deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances between and among two or more organizations,
trades, or businesses, whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in
the United States, and whether or not affiliated, if:
(1) the organizations, trades, or businesses are owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by the same interests within the meaning of § 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code; and
(2) the Comptroller determines that the distribution, apportionment, or al-
location is necessary in order to reflect an arm's length standard within
the meaning of § 1.482-1 of the regulations of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice of the U.S. Treasury and to reflect clearly the income of those orga-
nizations, trades, or businesses.
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tions otherwise allowed when calculating its federal taxable income.
172
However, a corporation may be excluded from this required "add
back" if it can show: (1) the principal purpose of the transaction was
not tax avoidance; (2) the interest or intangible expense paid was at
an arm's length rate or price; and (3) either (i) the related entity paid
or incurred interest or intangible expenses to unrelated entities, (ii)
the related entity paid an effective tax rate in Maryland of at least 4%
on the amount received, or (iii) the entities involved are banks and
the payment in question was an interest expense. 173 Finally, to guard
against potential double taxation, the bill outlines a modification pro-
vision applicable in certain situations. 174 For instance, the receiving
entity can reduce its taxable income in an amount equal to the royal-
ties, interest, or similar income from intangibles that it received, if the
paying entity is subject to the other provisions of the bill.'7 5 Neither
S.B. 187 nor H.B. 297 has yet been challenged in court.
III. ANALYSIS
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. and Comptroller of the Trea-
sury v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (Delaware), Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that taxing two out-of-state intangible holding
companies did not violate either the Commerce or the Due Process
Clause because the State satisfied the requisite nexus requirement to
tax the entities using a constructive approach.' 76 Yet, the court failed
to set forth a clear evaluation standard for determining when such
entities may be taxed. Instead of applying a single nexus theory, the
Court of Appeals in SYL employed components from several different
methods to reach its decision, which likely will cause confusion for
courts and businesses in the future.'7 7 Moreover, SYL failed to build
uniformity, lessen the administrative burden, and ensure relevancy, all
key components of a properly functioning tax system.' 78 Subse-
quently, the Maryland General Assembly enacted S.B. 187 and H.B.





176. SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 375 Md. 78, 80, 106, 825 A.2d 399, 400,
415 (2003).
177. See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text (outlining issues caused by combin-
ing several nexus theories such as, most importantly, the lack of guidance to lower courts).
178. See infra notes 216-248 and accompanying text (discussing the key elements of a
taxation system and why SYL failed to achieve those elements).
179. S.B. 187; H.B. 297.
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will only produce temporary relief given the potential legal challenges
by corporations, continued requirement of enforcement proceedings
by the State, and the likely standardization of allowable purposes for
which corporations can create entities to reduce their tax liability.180
A more effective response would have been to enact a combined re-
porting tax scheme, thus shifting Maryland away from its currently
used separate reporting plan because it would provide adequate gui-
dance to the business community, reduce the administrative burden
on the State, and allow for adequate legislative flexibility.181
A. The Court of Appeals'Decision in SYL Provided a Basis for the
General Assembly to Act
Rather than comprehensively utilize a single nexus theory, the
Court of Appeals merged elements of several different methods to
reach its decision in SYL. In particular, the court combined the par-
ent and subsidiary entities through the unitary business approach, cor-
roborated the existence of the subsidiary-parent relationship through
the agency theory, and then disregarded the separate entity arrange-
ment through the sham transaction doctrine.182 Ultimately, this ap-
proach led the court to conclude that the State had demonstrated the
requisite nexus with each subsidiary and thus could validly tax the sub-
sidiaries' income under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. 183
This fractured approach, however, provided a catalyst for the Mary-
land Legislature to enact S.B. 187 and H.B. 297.
Explicitly applying the unitary business approach, the court de-
termined that Maryland did satisfy the nexus requirement to SYL and
Crown-Delaware.' 84 Yet, the court's application of this approach was
faulty for two reasons. First, the court used the unitary business ap-
proach in a manner contrary to its designed purpose. 185 Citing an
article, the Court of Appeals noted that "[t] he nexus prong.., of the
test is satisfied by demonstrating the existence of [a] unitary business,
180. See infra text accompanying notes 249-278 (discussing the potential problems with
S.B. 187 and H.B. 297).
181. See Fallaw, supra note 27, at 46 (noting the benefits of combined versus separate
reporting).
182. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 100, 102, 106, 825 A.2d at 411-12, 413, 415.
183. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
184. Id. at 101, 106, 825 A.2d at 412, 415.
185. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983)
(noting that the unitary business principle is not concerned with geographic limits in de-
termining taxation of entities).
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part of which is carried on in the taxing state."' 8 6 However, in that
same article, the author also noted that the existence of a unitary busi-
ness would simply justify an apportioned share of all the income to be
taxed.1 87 In other words, the determination of a unitary business rela-
tionship only enables a subsidiary's income to be includable in the
corporation's total taxable income amount.18 8 It does not, however,
enable the state to expand its nexus reach by independently taxing
the out-of-state entity.189 Relaxing this distinction could ultimately
provide the states with an overly expansive nexus reach and, in turn,
create a costly, burdensome, and inefficient taxation system. 190
Second, the court failed to fully analyze the elements that consti-
tute a unitary business arrangement. To show a unitary business rela-
tionship, the Court of Appeals noted three factors that must be met,
as set forth by the Supreme Court in Allied Signal.9 ' Despite outlining
these factors, identifying the existence of a unitary relationship is still
a challenging endeavor for courts.1 92 Nonetheless, the Court of Ap-
peals failed to conduct even a minimal level of analysis of these ele-
ments. Rather, the court presumably relied upon the tax court's legal
conclusion that a unitary business relationship existed.' 9 3 Because of
the reliance the court placed on the existence of a unitary business
186. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 101, 825 A.2d at 412 (citing Walter Hellerstein, State Income
Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part II: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81
MICH. L. REV. 157, 168 (1982) (bracket omitted)).
187. Hellerstein, supra note 186, at 168.
188. In Container Corp., the Supreme Court stated:
The unitary business/formula apportionment method is a very different ap-
proach to the problem of taxing businesses operating in more than one jurisdic-
tion. It... calculates the local tax base by first defining the scope of the 'unitary
business' of which the taxed enterprise's activities in the taxing jurisdiction form
one part, and then apportioning the total income of that 'unitary business' be-
tween the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the basis of a formula
taking into account objective measures of the corporation's activities within and
without the jurisdiction.
463 U.S. at 165.
189. Id.
190. Hellerstein, supra note 186, at 298.
191. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 100, 825 A.2d at 412. These factors included: (1) functional
integration, (2) centralization of management, and (3) economies of scale. Id.
192. Compare Benjamin F. Miller, Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice, in
THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAx 132, 140 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984) ("One of
the most difficult issues involved in the application of the unitary business principle is
determining when a unitary business exists."), with Bobby L. Burgner, Remarks at Georgetown
University's State and Local Tax Institute about The Unitary Spectrum, ST. TAX TODAY, at 3 (May
24, 1999), available at 1999 STT 99-13 ("Unitary is a lot like pornography: I know it when I
see it.").
193. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 89, 99, 825 A.2d at 405, 411.
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relationship, its failure to analyze the underlying factors substantially
reduces the guidance the decision provides to lower courts.
Instead of conducting an independent analysis of the unitary bus-
iness components, the court used many factors from the agency
theory to demonstrate the existence of an integrated business rela-
tionship. For instance, the wholly owned nature of the parent-subsidi-
ary relationship, the inference that SYL and Crown-Delaware could
not operate but for the efforts of their parent corporations, and the
supportive nature of the activities conducted by the subsidiaries on
behalf of their parents, were noted as evidence that the parent-subsidi-
ary relationship was highly interconnected.194 However, had it used
the agency approach independently, the court would likely have not
been able to satisfy the nexus for taxing the subsidiaries for two rea-
sons. First, the agency approach may not have prevailed given the
facts in SYL. Specifically, the State would have had a challenge in
proving that SYL and Crown-Delaware were organized and controlled
in such a way as to transform them into agents of Syms-Parent and
Crown-Parent. 95 For instance, unlike in Western Acceptance Company,
no contractual relationship establishing an agency relationship ex-
isted between the subsidiaries and their parent companies.1 96 More-
over, unlike in Western Acceptance Company, the subsidiaries in SYL did
not authorize the parent companies to carry out the collection process
of its payments. 9 ' Thus, an agency relationship probably could not
be demonstrated in SYL. 9s The Court of Appeals did, however, con-
clude that nothing had changed with respect to the management and
protection of the intellectual assets following their relocation to the
subsidiaries.' 99 Nonetheless, a relationship of transferred authority in
which one party was subjected to the control of the other would have
been difficult to prove.2"'
194. Id. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415; see also supra notes 141-150 and accompanying text
(outlining the factors the court noted from Atlantic and Armco); Barrie & Iles, supra note
21, at 19 (noting general factors for establishing a nexus under an agency theory).
195. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 56 (1985) (noting that "separate corporate exis-
tence of parent and subsidiary... corporations will not be recognized where one corpora-
tion is so organized and controlled... as to make it merely an agency... corporation").
196. 472 So. 2d 497, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
197. Id. In fact, for both subsidiaries in SYL the parent corporations' royalty payments
were the only source of income for the subsidiary companies. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 84, 94,
825 A.2d at 403, 409.
198. An agency relationship is created when "the principal party is willing to allow the
other party ... to act for it subject to the principal's control and within the limits of the
authority thus conferred." Pensee Assocs., Ltd. v. Quon Indus., Ltd., 660 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566-
67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
199. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
200. See Pensee Assocs., Ltd., 660 N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
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Second, even if an agency relationship could have been estab-
lished, Maryland could still not directly tax the subsidiaries. 20 1 The
agency relationship enables the parent to be liable for the wrongs of
its subsidiaries. 20 2 It does not, however, allow a state to go after, or in
this case directly tax, the subsidiary company. 203 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals only used elements of the agency theory to support
the interrelated relationship between the subsidiaries and their
parents.20 4
Finally, by implicitly adopting a sham transaction doctrine argu-
ment, the court determined that SYL and Crown-Delaware were not
entities of substance. 20 5 However, looking at the same facts and con-
ducting similar evaluation approaches, the Court of Appeals and the
Maryland Tax Court arrived at opposite conclusions about the compo-
sition of the entities. 20 6 Although both courts generally considered
the business purpose and economic substance of the subsidiaries,
each focused on different facts.2 0 7 For example, the tax court deter-
mined that the subsidiaries were entities of substance as they main-
tained an office outside Maryland, established a bank account and
mailing address in Maryland, retained counsel to maintain and pro-
tect the intellectual property assets, and provided legitimate business
purposes.20 8 In contrast, the Court of Appeals determined that the
subsidiaries were not entities of substance because they had no full-
time employees, had minimal capacity in the office locations, per-
formed little substantial activity, and the predominant reason for their
formation was for tax avoidance. 20 9 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the separate corporate form of the subsidiaries should
201. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 313 (2002) (noting that as long as the agency relationship is
disclosed, the agent cannot be held individually liable).
202. See Astrocom Electronics, Inc. v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 404 N.Y.S.2d
742, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (noting that the parent company's liability would be trig-
gered should an agency relationship be established).
203. See supra note 201 (noting that the agent will not necessarily be liable in such an
instance).
204. See SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415 (noting that neither subsidiary com-
pany had any "real economic substance as separate business entities").
205. Id.; see also supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text (outlining the court's eco-
nomic substance analysis).
206. SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 WL 322666, at *3-
4 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999); Crown Cork & Seal (Delaware) Inc. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury, No. C-97-0028-01, 1999 WL 322699, at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999); SYL, Inc.,
375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
207. See id.
208. SYL, Inc., 1999 WL 322666, at *3-4; Crown Cork & Seal (Delaware) Inc., 1999 WL
322699, at *1.
209. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 106, 825 A.2d at 415.
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be disregarded and, therefore, Maryland should be allowed to tax the
individual entities.21 °
This conclusion is problematic. Generally, once a court deter-
mines that a subsidiary is not an entity of economic substance, the
appropriate tax remedy is to simply disallow the deductions taken by
the parent company. 211 The parent company would then add back
the amount deducted to its own taxable income and pay the appropri-
ate tax.212 Importantly, by following this approach, a state ultimately
taxes the parent company, not the subsidiary directly.213 This practice,
however, was not followed in SYL.
Instead, once the Court of Appeals determined that SYL and
Crown-Delaware were not entities of substance, it permitted Maryland
to directly tax the individual incomes of the subsidiaries. 214 Had it
simply disallowed the deductions taken by the parent companies for
the royalty payments made to the subsidiaries, the court could have
achieved the same result without having to extend the nexus range of
the State. Ultimately, this result would have helped to produce a
more efficient and cost-effective taxation system by reducing the ad-
ministrative burden on the State.21 5
B. Characteristics of a Properly Functioning Taxation System
Given the constant struggle between the states' desire to increase
revenue and the corporations' desire to minimize taxes, determining
210. Id. Ironically, the court decided to disregard the entities because they lacked eco-
nomic substance, yet it found that the entities had enough substance to be individually
taxed.
211. Peter L. Faber, "State of Practice": Intangible Holding Companies Set Back in Maryland
and New York, ST. TAX TODAY, July 22, 2003, at 43; see also BoRis I. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAxA-
TION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFTs § 4.3.4A, S4-20 (Supp. 2003) (stating that once a trans-
action is determined to be a sham the taxpayer should lose both the tax benefit and the
deduction sought by the transaction). For example, in Syms Corporation v. Commissioner of
Revenue, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that (1) tax avoidance was
a clear motivating factor for establishing SYL and (2) SYL lacked economic substance. 765
N.E.2d 758, 764 (Mass. 2002). Consequently, the court determined that the royalty pay-
ments to SYL could not be deducted and thus Syms-Parent, not SYL, owed taxes on the
disallowed amount. Id.
212. See Syms Corp., 765 N.E.2d at 766 ("By disallowing those deductions, the [Appellate
Tax Board] did not apply a unitary theory of taxation to reach the non-Massachusetts in-
come [;] [r]ather, it simply rejected a deduction which is notjustifiable under the facts of a
particular transaction.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id.
214. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 109, 825 A.2d at 417.
215. See infta notes 216-248 and accompanying text (noting the beneficial elements to a
successful taxation program).
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a feasible tax approach is challenging.216 This challenge has become
even more contentious in recent years, as deficit-conscious states have
found their corporate income tax revenues in decline despite the dra-
matic increase in corporate profits.2 17 Notwithstanding these desires,
there are several elements to a tax plan that should be objectively
measured.218
First, an appropriate taxation scheme must support uniformity. 219
In particular, given the divergent methods used by states to determine
the applicable taxable income the standard used for establishing
nexus should clearly distinguish between satisfactory and unsatisfac-
tory nexus.220 This task, however, is complicated by the fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry for determining nexus.221 Therefore, instituting
uniformity in the nexus standard would significantly reduce the ambi-
guity presented to the business community by providing a test or prin-
ciples with which companies could comply. 222
Recently, over one-third of financial and tax executives polled in-
dicated that uncertainty regarding nexus was their primary state taxa-
tion concern. 223  Moreover, these financial and tax executives
believed that as a result of the ambiguity in the different state taxation
schemes, their organizations' growth suffered.224 Thus, on one hand,
businesses want states to actively lessen the taxation complexities. 225
But, on the other hand, businesses want states to preserve their sover-
216. Craig J. Langstraat & Emily S. Lemmon, Economic Nexus: Legislative Presumption or
Legitimate Proposition?, 14 AKRON TAXJ. 1, 25 (1999).
217. Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education, Dan R. Bucks,
Tax Planning-A State's Perspective, available at 2003 WL 22002137, at *7 (May 15-16, 2003).
218. See George B. Delta, State Taxation of the Internet: A Review of Some Issues, 7 WILLAM-
ETTEJ. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 136, 166 (2000) (noting that "no matter how good tax policy
may be, if it is not fair, easy to understand, easy to apply, and easy to comply with, it will not
raise revenue effectively").
219. Eugene Corrigan, "The Long View": Hope for a Uniform State Tax System?, ST. TAX
TODAY, Sept. 15, 2003, at 2, available at LEXIS, 2003 ST" 178-5.
220. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An Economist's View, in THE
STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 89, 90 (Charles E. McLure,Jr. ed., 1984) (noting that due
to the discrepancy in taxation standards among the states there is a need to define the
unitary business principle with clarity and certainty); Delta, supra note 218, at 166 (noting
the need for clarity).
221. See Fallaw, supra note 27, at 46 (noting the fact-specific nature of the inquiry to
determine the substance and purpose of a subsidiary); Faber, supra note 211, at 46 (noting
that facts in every case are different and thus each case requires personalized analysis).
222. E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992) (noting that uniformity
in the sales and use tax laws provides certainty, which encourages investment within the
business community).
223. Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 216, at 2.
224. Delta, supra note 218, at 165.
225. Id. States too would like to see businesses operating in their regions succeed, as
their economies depend on the companies' well-being. Id.
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eign right, because it is the states' sovereignty that allows them to pro-
vide tax-based incentives to the companies for operating within their
borders. 2 6 Not surprisingly, states must traverse a tight line when es-
tablishing taxation standards.
The SYL decision, however, failed to bolster this uniformity ele-
ment. Employing a combined approach, the Court of Appeals failed
to provide a clear nexus standard for businesses and lower courts. In
addition, by relying on an individualized, fact-intensive inquiry as to
the substance of subsidiary entities, the Court of Appeals' decision
now forces the State, businesses, and courts to undertake the same
time consuming and costly evaluation method in order to determine
taxation of out-of-state companies.227 Moreover, the court failed to
identify the specific determinative factors it used to achieve its out-
come. 228 The SYL decision therefore does not support the goal of
establishing a uniform taxation system.
Second, in addition to benefiting businesses, a reduction in un-
certainty would also enable states to achieve administratively feasible
taxation schemes.229 Typically, administrative expenditures include
two significant costs. The first expense is the cost of compliance.23 °
Because of the lack of a universal bright-line rule and the case-by-case
nature of the required inquiry, nexus issues can be costly to recognize
and remedy. 231 Therefore, the compliance burden tends to be sub-
stantial for both businesses and states.23 2 The second expense is the
cost of prosecution and enforcement. 23 This burden, however, ini-
tially rests primarily on the states. 23 '4 For a state to implement its taxa-
tion policies, it must endure the costly investment of identifying out-
of-state companies that may have a nexus with the state. 235 Thus,
226. Shafroth, supra note 20, at 22-23. But see Corrigan, supra note 219, at 20-22 (ques-
tioning whether states really achieve a benefit by providing significant tax incentives to
businesses).
227. TROST & HARTMAN, supra note 30, § 10.29 (noting that the factors that demonstrate
a unitary business operation vary depending on the nature of the business).
228. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 59, 106, 825 A.2d 399, 415
(2003) (presenting the numerous findings it made to enable the State to tax the
subsidiaries).
229. TROST & HARTMAN, supra note 30, § 10.7.
230. Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 216, at 23.
231. Id. at 23-24.
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given the complexity of the nexus inquiry and the states' existing
budget constraints, enforcement of tax crimes will likely suffer.2 6
The Court of Appeals' decision in SYL also failed to lessen the
administrative burden on Maryland. In fact, the decision seems to
have readily increased the likelihood of future challenges to taxation
that the State may endure. 237 The current approach that the court
outlined in SYL necessitates a very fact-intensive inquiry into the (1)
evaluation of a unitary relationship and (2) determination of the eco-
nomic substance of the subsidiary entity.238 Moreover, this analysis
requires a court to have substantive knowledge about the operations
of numerous industries and technical knowledge about accounting
procedures. 23 9 As a result of the SYL decision, however, the Maryland
Comptroller estimated that the ruling could provide an additional $33
million in corporate income tax revenue to the State.240 Over the
long run, though, it appears that the complexities for businesses and
courts could result in future difficulties for the State through in-
creased compliance and prosecution costs and the potential loss of
businesses to the State.2"1
The final critical element for a viable taxation scheme is rele-
vancy. 242 More precisely, an appropriate taxation approach must be
applicable to the current business environment. 243 For instance, the
United States economy has shifted from a tangible-oriented manufac-
236. See Georgetown University Law Center, supra note 217, at *9 (noting that in con-
junction with the decrease of Internal Revenue Service auditors over the last ten years from
16,000 to 12,000, tax fraud assessments declined from 555 to 159, and negligence penalties
declined from 2,376 to just 22 over that same period); Corrigan, supra note 219, at 10
(noting that states generally have notably fewer resources and less expertise than the Inter-
nal Revenue Service with regard to corporate taxation); David S. Broder, Budget Gloom State
by State, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at B7 (outlining the growing budget deficits faced by
many states).
237. See Faber, supra note 211, at 47 (commenting that taxpayers in Maryland will likely
question the Court of Appeals' decision and challenge the State's assessment on an individ-
ualized basis).
238. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 59, 102, 825 A.2d 399, 413
(2003).
239. TROST & HARTMAN, supra note 30, § 10.29.
240. Shafroth, supra note 20, at 14.
241. See Hollis L. Hyans & Amy F. Nogid, "A View From the Front Line": New Jersey's Business
Reform Act-The Issues Abound, ST. TAX TODAY, July 14, 2003, at 2, available at LEXIS, 2003
STT 134-26 (noting the negative impact on businesses in New Jersey as a result of divisive
legislation).
242. This element seems also to be related to the interest of uniformity.
243. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Our con-




turing sector to an intangible-driven services sector.244 The tradi-
tional Quill physical presence standard, however, seems to lack
practicality in the modern digital age.245 For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals recently stated: "It is increasingly clear that mod-
ern businesses no longer require an actual physical presence in a state
in order to engage in commercial activity there."246 Therefore, the
nexus standards must reflect these environmental and business
changes.
By applying an attributional nexus approach, the Court of Ap-
peals has fittingly moved Maryland away from the outdated physical
presence standard. Although this initial step was necessary, it was not
sufficient.247 Therefore, instead of using the courts on a case-by-case
basis to establish the boundaries of nexus, a more practical solution
may be to enact statutory laws that uniformly define the practice and
procedure for determining the scope of state taxation laws.24 8
C. The Maryland General Assembly's Response Is Inadequate
1. Senate Bill 187.-S.B. 187 was enacted to establish a statutory
settlement period during which corporations could pay tax liabilities
from years past based on the Court of Appeals' decision in SYL.249
Employing a voluntary settlement program has proved beneficial in
some instances. For example, California offered a "voluntary compli-
ance initiative" to individuals and businesses to enable them to pay
any outstanding taxes owed and avoid penalties. 25 ° This offer, which
expired in April of 2004, raised more than $1.3 billion. 2 ' Despite the
potential benefit in Maryland, 25 2 S.B. 187 appears ineffective for two
reasons.
244. Shafroth, supra note 20, at 22.
245. See Delta, supra note 218, at 165 (noting that the traditional nexus rules are not
easily adaptable to electronic goods and services-based economies that lack definable
borders).
246. Gator.com Corp., 341 F.3d at 1081.
247. See supra notes 219-240 and accompanying text (noting the court's decision failed
to support the objectives of uniformity and provide an administratively feasible solution).
248. See, e.g., Delta, supra note 218, at 165 (commenting that, especially in the area of
electronic commerce, Congress should enact federal uniform legislation to regulate the
taxing of electronic transactions).
249. S.B. 187, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004).
250. Tom Herman, Recent Growth Could Boost State Programs, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at
D1.
251. Id.
252. At the time of the Court of Appeals' decision, SYL was estimated to have implica-
tions for over 70 cases. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS,
ISSUE PAPERS: 2004 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 33 (2003).
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First, the Court of Appeals' decision in SYL may not be readily
applicable to other fact scenarios. Given the fact-specific nature of the
Court of Appeals' inquiry for determining nexus, and absence of a
clearly presented uniform standard for establishing nexus, the deci-
sion in SYL likely will be construed narrowly. For instance, Maryland
Senators Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. (D) and Paul G. Pinsky (D) intro-
duced a bill following SYL, which ultimately was not enacted, because
"they feared the ruling was too narrow to apply to all cases." '253 There-
fore, the uncertainty in the direct application of SYL combined with
state tax administrators' aversion of resolving tax liabilities issues in
court illustrates that S.B. 187 is an ill-suited measure of discontinuing
the use of intangible holding companies.254
Second, corporations may contest the general validity of the
Court of Appeals' decision in SYL. Although the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari for both SYL and Crown Cork,25 5 recent cases may evi-
dence a shift to retard the latest attempts of closing taxation holes
using the Judiciary. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has recently been unsuccessful in prosecuting several large corpora-
tions for allegedly abusing tax shelters.256 In Coltec Industries, Inc. v.
United States,2 5 7 the United States Court of Federal Claims disagreed
with the IRS' long-standing interpretation of the tax code, and re-
jected the notion that despite technically complying with the code, a
tax avoidance strategy is abusive if the IRS determines the transaction
lacks economic substance.258 The court noted that had Congress in-
tended the doctrine, it should have explicitly included it in the tax
code.2 59 In addition, in TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,26° a United
253. Karen Setze, Maryland Bill Would End Delaware Holding Company Deduction, ST. TAx
TODAY, Jan. 30, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, 2004 STT 20-11. See also 4 MARYLAND BUDGET
& TAx POLICY INSTITUTE, Corporate Tax Avoidance 101 (and Which Loopholes Were Not Addressed
by HB 753), No. 5, at 4 (2004) [hereinafter Corporate Tax Avoidance] ("It is not clear how
broadly [SYL] will apply to other companies that transfer their profits to out of state trade-
mark holding companies.").
254. Kenneth H. Silverberg & Nicholas J. Guttilla, "Tax Counsels' Corner" Finding the
Gaps, the Nooks, and the Crannies in This Year's Anti-PIC Legislation, ST. TAx TODAY, Sept. 7,
2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, 2004 STT 173-5 (noting that state tax administrators dislike
using the courts to enforce corporate income tax laws given the uncertainties, delays, and
ability of non-litigant corporations to modify their practices based on unsuccessful
approaches).
255. SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 478 (2003); Crown
Cork & Seal Company (Delaware), Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 124 S.
Ct. 961 (2003).
256. Jonathan Weil, Court Backs Unit of GE in IRS Case Over Tax Shelters, WALL ST.J., Nov.
4, 2004, at A3.
257. No. 01-072T, 2004 U.S. Claims LEXIS 286 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 29, 2004).
258. Id. at n.21.
259. Id. at n.22.
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States District Court in Connecticut did not go so far as to reject the
doctrine of economic substance, but it did find that the tax avoidance
transaction carried out by a General Electric subsidiary did have some
economic substance.261 As such, the entity's use of the tax avoidance
strategy was not abusive. 262 Thus, as the court noted, "the IRS should
address its concerns to those who write the tax laws." 263
Given both the potential challenges to the direct factual applica-
tion and overall validity of the legal theory relied on in SYL, many
corporations have decided to decline the offer in S.B. 187. In fact, the
Maryland Department of Legislative Services noted that "a significant
number of taxpayers have rejected the Comptroller's settlement of-
fer." '26 4 As such, the ultimate effectiveness of S.B. 187 appears
minimal.
2. House Bill 297.-H.B. 297 was enacted to prospectively pre-
vent the further use of out-of-state intangible holding companies. 265
Although it represents a proper step toward uniformity, this bill may
not entirely achieve the desired results. In particular, H.B. 297 fails to
protect the State from continued litigation regarding the use of intan-
gible holding companies and, in fact, has the potential to produce
lower tax revenue.
In 1999, in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Gannett Company, Inc.,2 6 6
the Court of Appeals held that, without a specific legislative grant, the
Comptroller lacked the power to modify the taxable income for an
affiliated company in Maryland. 267 Consequently, H.B. 297 does suc-
cessfully provide the Comptroller with the proper authority to over-
come the hurdle of Gannett in certain circumstances; but, it also
exposes the State to other types of legal challenges from corporations.
First, corporations could challenge the validity of this new pro-
spective law based on Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause
arguments. Under the Commerce Clause, a corporation could argue
260. No. 3:01CV1839, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22119 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2004).
261. Id. at *80.
262. Id. at *82. Using these tax avoidance strategies, GE had reduced the income tax it
paid on its earnings from 28.3% in 2001 to 21.7% in 2003. Weil, supra note 256, at A3.
263. TIED III-E Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22119, at *83.
264. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, THE 90 DAY RE-
PORT-A REVIEW OF THE 2004 LEGISLATIVE SESSION B-9 (2004); see also Silverberg & Guttilla,
supra note 254, at 3 (noting that the Comptroller offered a limited amnesty to intangible
holding company users, after the SYL decision but prior to the enactment of S.B. 187, and
only fourteen percent of taxpayers took advantage of the offer).
265. H.B. 297, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004).
266. 356 Md. 699, 741 A.2d 1130 (1999).
267. Id. at 723, 741 A.2d at 1143.
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that by blindly disallowing the interest and intangible expenses, the
state is taxing in excess of its "fair share. ' 26" For instance, H.B. 297
appears to exempt from the required "add back" procedure interest
and intangible expenses taxed by another state; yet, it includes in the
taxable amount owed to Maryland expenses that are not taxed by an-
other state. 26" This provision, however, seems to fall outside of the
doctrine of basing the tax on an entity's relationship with the State,
and instead determines the taxable amount based on the entity's taxa-
tion status with another state.2 v° Also, despite the decision in SYL, the
issue of permissible nexus in Maryland seems still unresolved. For in-
stance, corporations not using intangible holding companies can con-
tinue to argue they lack sufficient nexus to the State, and thus are
absolved of paying corporate income ta271
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits states
from acting in an arbitrary or irrational manner with regard to their
taxing authority. 272 Thus, under the "add back" provision of H.B. 297,
banks receive an explicit automatic statutory discharge from establish-
ing the third prong where the deduction in dispute is an interest ex-
pense. 27 3 As such, non-bank corporations may be able to successfully
argue that this provision is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
as it is arbitrary and irrational.
Corporations could also challenge the "add back" provision of
H.B. 297 using another approach. To overcome the disallowance of
deductions otherwise allowed when calculating its federal taxable in-
come, a corporation must establish three elements. 274 The first is that
the principal purpose of the transaction is not tax avoidance. 275 Evi-
denced by the opposing opinions of the Maryland Tax Court and the
Court of Appeals in SYL, determining whether an entity satisfies a le-
268. Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 3.
269. Id.; Md. H.B. 297.
270. Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 3.
271. See, e.g., Corporate Tax Avoidance, supra note 253, at 6 (noting that cable and other
media outlets earn profit in Maryland, yet avoid paying taxes on the profits of their out-of-
state subsidiaries because they do not have a nexus to the state).
272. Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal
Protection Clause states that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
273. H.B. 297, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004).
274. Id. The Maryland Legislature aptly placed the burden on the corporation should it
attempt to prevent the state from disallowing the deductions. Otherwise, the state would
be faced with a significant burden of demonstrating the elements in each situation it at-
tempts to disallow the deduction.
275. H.B. 297; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text (outlining the elements to
overcome the disallowance of deductions).
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gitimate business purpose is a challenging endeavor.2 76 In particular,
the courts differed in regard to how far the stated purpose should be
probed.277 Accordingly, corporations have a number of challenges at
their disposal to combat the effectiveness of H.B. 297.
Next, H.B. 297 may actually streamline methods for reducing the
amount of taxes corporations must pay. For instance, the flipside of
standardizing facets of a valid business purpose is that corporations
could then readily use "canned" allowable purposes when establishing
entities to shield tax liability.278 It appears that H.B. 297 would not
require an analysis past the form (i.e., the purpose) to the substance
(i.e., the actual transaction) of the tax avoidance scheme. As a result,
using pro forma business purposes could allow corporations to more
easily establish the business purpose prong and show that the interest
and intangible expenses should not be added back to the Maryland
taxable income.
D. Maryland Should Ultimately Adopt a Combined Reporting Approach
Given the probable opposition to and uncertainty surrounding
the Court of Appeals' decision in SYL and subsequent legislation, the
Maryland General Assembly will likely be forced to revisit the State's
corporate income tax policies.279 In particular, the legislature will
need to consider whether it is best to continue using a separate re-
porting scheme, thus forcing the State and courts to make individual-
ized assessments as to the companies it can constitutionally tax, or
276. See supra notes 127 & 155 and accompanying text (outlining the decisions of the
courts in SYL with regard to the business purpose for the formation of the intangible hold-
ing company).
277. Id.
278. David J. Shipley et al., A New Paradigm for State Corporate Income Tax Planning: Part
1-The Changing State Environment, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 7, 2004, at 4-5, available at LEXIS,
2004 STT 173-2 (outlining the most often cited business purposes when establishing an
intangible holding company: to provide better centralized management of trademarks and
trade names; to protect trademarks and trade names from creditors of the transferor; to
avoid a hostile takeover of the transferor; to maximize value of trademarks and trade
names; to increase borrowing potential; to facilitate acquisitions of businesses; and to ob-
tain the protections of Delaware's corporate laws and legal system).
279. See Craig B. Fields, State Challenges to Related Party Transactions, in STATE & LocAL
TAXATION 29, 65 (2003) (noting that in Massachusetts, following the decisions in Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002), and Syms Corp. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 2002), the legislature passed Mass. S.B.
1949, which codified the sham doctrine); Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 2 (com-
menting that states' legislative attempts to eliminate the use of intangible holding compa-
nies are unnecessary if the states move from separate to combined reporting).
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shift to a combined reporting scheme, thus creating a wholesale ap-
proach to determining constitutionally taxable income.
210
1. Separate v. Combined Reporting Taxation Schemes for Multi-Juris-
dictional Corporations.-Two methods are available for assessing a
state's taxable income from multi-jurisdictional corporations.281 Cur-
rently, Maryland follows a separate reporting scheme.28 2 As such,
each entity is required to file a separate tax return that accounts for its
state income.2 8 3 However, this method allows businesses that attempt
to minimize taxes to align their low revenue generating entities in
high-tax states and high revenue generating entities in low-tax
states. 284 Moreover, this approach places a large administrative bur-
den on a state to determine and validate each entity's income for state
285taxation purposes.
Alternatively, Maryland could follow a combined reporting
method. In doing so, Maryland would treat separate corporations that
are part of a single economic trade or business as a single unit for
income attribution purposes. 286 Consequently, the total business in-
come of the unit would then be calculated and allocated to states
based on an apportionment scheme. 287 Of course, businesses can ar-
gue that a single entity is not part of the unitary group and thus its
income should not be included when calculating the total amount.
288
In 2002, over 25 states had decided to follow the combined reporting
method.289
280. SeeJill S. Chanen, Taxes R' Ours: Suits Challenge Loophole that Lets National Corpora-
tions Dodge State Taxes, ABA JOURNAL, April 2004, at 26 (noting that the use of a combined
reporting scheme "undoes the use of subsidiaries for tax avoidance purposes").
281. Steven M. Sheffrin &Jack Fulcher, Alternative Divisions of the Tax Base: How Much Is
at Stake? in THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAx 192, 204 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed.,
1984).
282. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 83, 825 A.2d 399, 402 (2003);
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-811 (1997).
283. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. at 83, 825 A.2d at 402; § 10-811.
284. William D. Dexter, Panel Discussion on W. Hellerstein, in THE STATE CORPORATION
INCOME TAX 341, 346 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984).
285. Sheffrin & Fulcher, supra note 281, at 204.
286. Dexter, supra note 284, at 346; Georgetown University Law Center, supra note 217,
at *9.
287. Georgetown University Law Center, supra note 217, at *9.
288. Dexter, supra note 284, at 346. Accordingly, how the court defines a unitary busi-
ness becomes very important for obvious reasons. Id.
289. Simpson, supra note 1, at Al. For example, New York requires corporations to file
a combined tax return when they meet several requirements. McMahan, supra note 3, at
66. The requirements include: "(1) the company directly or indirectly owns 80 percent or
more of the stock of the company sought to be combined, (2) the corporations are a
unitary business, and (3) the commissioner deems that combined reporting is necessary to
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2. Using a Combined Reporting Approach in Maryland.-Because of
its adherence to a separate reporting scheme, Maryland's legislature
and courts are forced to constantly create stopgap measures to combat
tax avoidance methods, as corporations will continue to find ways to
reduce their tax liability. 9° These piecemeal solutions, however, are
unnecessary under a combined reporting scheme."' In fact, all 25
states with a unified corporate income tax plan have eliminated the
impact of intangible holding companies.292
Maryland should adopt combined reporting for three primary
reasons. First, combined reporting would provide a clear, uniform
standard for businesses across all industries, not solely those using in-
tangible holding companies. 293 This way, similarly situated groups of
businesses would pay the same aggregate amount regardless of their
legal corporate structure.29 4 In contrast to the uncertain standard es-
tablished in SYL, and codified in S.B. 187, combined reporting would
improve equity in the tax system and provide businesses a much
clearer standard from which to proceed. 29 5
Second, using a combined reporting approach would reduce the
administrate burden on the State. Combined reporting is less com-
properly reflect the tax liability of the companies." Id. With regard to intangible holding
companies, New York courts have determined that as long as the entity proves it is not a
sham, it will avoid combined reporting. Id. at 67. Consequently, the burden and presuma-
bly the majority of costs rest on the taxpayer to demonstrate it is not a sham entity. Id. at
66. This is contrary to the general current practices in Maryland where the state retains
the substantial burden of identifying and demonstrating the sham entity before it can be
taxed. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 102, 825 A.2d 388, 413
(2003). As noted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Atlan-
tic Supply Company, by requiring a consolidated tax return "the microscopic examination of
the legal niceties of [a subsidiary] as a specific corporate entity would be avoided." 294
Md. 213, 220, 448 A.2d 955, 959 (1982).
290. Corporate Tax Avoidance, supra note 253, at 3, 9 (noting that when Provident Bank-
shares Corporation Chief Financial Officer was asked about the company's rationale for
utilizing a Delaware subsidiary to lessen its taxes, he responded: "Geez, why not?"); see also
Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 2 (noting that states' legislative attempts to elimi-
nate the use of intangible holding corporations are unnecessary if the states move from
separate to combined reporting); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934)
(noting that "there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes").
291. Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 2.
292. Raising Revenue, supra note 159, at 4; see also Howard, supra note 3, at 571 (com-
menting that combined reporting states do not face the issue of losing revenue from intan-
gible holding companies).
293. See Corporate Tax Avoidance, supra note 253, at 6 (noting that cable and other media
outlets, as well as other vertically integrated businesses, earn profit in Maryland, yet avoid
paying taxes on the profits because they do not have a nexus to the state).
294. Michael J. McIntyre et al., Designing a Combined Reporting Regime for a State Corporate
Income Tax: A Case Study of Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REv. 699, 703 (2001).
295. See supra text accompanying note 223 (noting the concern of ambiguity regarding
nexus by financial and tax corporate executives).
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plex than separate reporting and eliminates the opportunities for cor-
porations to minimize their tax burdens.296 In addition, there is no
need for state tax administrators to undertake extensive detection and
enforcement efforts of entities to uncover abusive tax avoidance strat-
egies as required under separate reporting. 29 7 The State would also
not be required to monitor the price of inter-company transactions to
ensure market price is used.2 8 The case-by-case nature required
under separate reporting further intensifies the administrative burden
on the State.299 Although the State will undoubtedly be required to
perform an audit review under combined reporting, this cost will
likely be more than offset by the significant reduction in investigation
and litigation expenses.300 As such, combined reporting would re-
duce the administrative burden.
Finally, combined reporting still provides the Maryland Legisla-
ture with sufficient flexibility. For instance, the legislature could statu-
torily define which entities should be included when determining the
composition of a unitary business. 0 1 Although the general concept of
a unitary business is established, states have flexibility in determining
the specific components. 0 2 In addition, states have direct control
over the apportionment formula that determines a corporation's taxa-
ble income.30 3 Thus, Maryland could continue to provide incentives
for certain types of businesses by altering the apportionment
formula.30 4 Lastly, under a combined reporting scheme, Maryland
would still be permitted to reduce the overall taxation rates to provide
further incentives for businesses.30 5 As such, combined reporting still
296. McIntyre et al., supra note 294, at 706, 709.
297. Id. at 706.
298. Id. at 710. This task under separate reporting is particularly exacerbated with in-
tangible companies, as the market value of intangible assets is often very hard to calculate.
Id. at 705.
299. Id. at 708.
300. Id. at 710.
301. SeeJohn E. Gaggini et al., State Taxation of Passive Income Subsidiaries, in TAx LAW &
PRACTICE 2002, at 169, 200-02 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan. Course, Handbook Series No. 540,
2002) (outlining several tests that have been established to define a unitary business).
302. Id.; see also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 167 (1983)
(noting that there is more than one way to satisfy the unitary theory).
303. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 199-200. States using combined reporting have used a
variety of allocation methods. Id. at 207-13.
304. See Corporate Tax Avoidance, supra note 253, at 8 (noting that in 2001 manufacturing
firms successfully lobbied for legislation that changed the formula for determining their
taxable income); NO Corporate Income, supra note 159, at 2 (commenting that changing the
apportionment formula provides enormous tax cuts to the firms effected).
305. McIntyre et al., supra note 294, at 715.
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respects Maryland's sovereignty rights by providing the State with flex-
ibility in defining its taxation policies.
Under a combined reporting scheme, corporations are not how-
ever defenseless against the states. Rather, there are two important
limitations. A corporation could first argue that a particular entity is
not part of the unitary business.3 °6 If successful, the disputed entity
would not be included when calculating the aggregated taxable
amount. 3° 7 However, even if a unitary business relationship was estab-
lished, the corporation could next argue that the particular transac-
tion was unrelated to the unitary business.30 ' Both of these challenges
are predicated on the nexus limitation that states may tax income only
attributable or in some way connected to it.30 9 Accordingly, corpora-
tions do have sufficient protections against states under a combined
reporting scheme.
Despite the potential benefits of combined reporting, Maryland
faces two notable hurdles. Perhaps most importantly, adopting com-
bined reporting poses a political challenge. In addition to the politi-
cal wrangling that would likely occur when modifying the long-
standing separate reporting scheme, legislators fear budgetary uncer-
tainty.3 10 In particular, moving to a new corporate income taxation
policy would make it difficult for the State to initially accurately pre-
dict its tax revenues.311 On top of that, there is a potential for a loss of
some tax revenue from combined reporting. For instance, under the
combined method, both the incomes and losses of the entities of the
unitary group are pooled together.312 The corporation could there-
fore use the total aggregate losses to offset some or all of the total
aggregate gains, thus reducing the taxable income.313 Ultimately, this
could lead to a loss in tax revenues for the State. Yet, considering the
decrease in administrative expenses, Maryland likely would come out
ahead. Moreover, the Maryland Department of Legislative Services es-
timated that Maryland annually loses $100 million in lost revenue be-
cause it does not follow combined reporting.3 14 Thus, although
306. Id. at 709.
307. Id.
308. Id. This argument however would be difficult to prevail on, given the general pre-
sumption that entities that are commonly controlled usually make up a unitary business.
Id.
309. Id. at 717-18.
310. Silverberg & Guttilla, supra note 254, at 2.
311. Id.
312. Gaggini et al., supra note 301, at 199.
313. McMahan, supra note 3, at 10; Howard, supra note 3, at 571.
314. Raising Revenue, supra note 159, at 5.
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legislators should consider these obstacles, implementing combined
reporting should yield significant benefits to courts, businesses, and
the State.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc. and Comptroller of the Trea-
sury v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (Delaware), Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals held that a constructive nexus approach could be used to tax
out-of-state intangible holding companies where the entities had no
real economic substance. 31 5 The General Assembly then enacted Sen-
ate Bill 187 and House Bill 297 to codify the prohibition against using
intangible holding companies exclusively for tax avoidance pur-
poses. 31 6 These efforts are additional pieces of the evolving puzzle of
corporate taxation. While this legislation is beneficial, because Mary-
land still employs separate reporting, it will only produce temporary
relief.317 A more effective response is enacting a combined reporting
tax scheme.318 Instituting a combined reporting scheme will provide
businesses more clarity, reduce the administrative burden on the
State, and still provide Maryland sufficient flexibility in its legislative
affairs.31 9
BRIAN T. DIAMOND
315. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 106, 825 A.2d 388, 415
(2003).
316. S.B. 187, 418th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004); H.B. 297, 418th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004); see also notes 162-175 and accompanying text (summarizing each of
the bills).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 249-278 (discussing the potential problems with
S.B. 187 and H.B. 297 such as continued litigation efforts for the state and the likelihood
of developing a clear standard that corporations can use to shield their tax liability).
318. See Fallaw, supra note 27, at 46 (noting the benefits of a combined reporting
scheme).
319. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992) (noting the benefits
of a combined reporting scheme).
1109

